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Abstract
Older workers are likely to face different wage offers for work
while not retired than for work while partially retired. Conventional
analyses of wage profiles pool all waqe observations without distin-
guishingamong individuals according to retirement status.
Ourempirical analysis suggests the following conclusions.1)
Wages for work while not retired and for work while partially retired
are significantly different from one another.2) wage offers facing
older workers may vary considerably between those who do and do not
facelower limit constraints requiring full-time work or rinTlo at all
on their main job. 3) Failing to distinguish between wagespaid to
thepartially retired and to the not retired causesa sizable
exaggeration of the decline with experience in the wage offer for










(806) 742—2203This paper will raise and attempt to answer a number of questions
concerning the relation of wage rates for older males to their job
tenure and labor market experience. From past research it is known that
at higher levels of experience the earning profile turns down, with
much of the explanation for the downturn due to a decline in work time.
Somewhat less is known about wage rate profiles, expecially about wage
rate profiles for older workers. Recently, researchers have focused
on this subject, studying wages for older workers directly (Carliner,
1982) or as a by—product of a study of retirement behavior (Gordon and
Blinder, 1980).
There is a potential problem with what we will call the "conventional
approach" to computing wage profiles for older workers. These workers
face at least two simultaneous alternatives. They may work at relatively
high wages while not retired, or they may partially retire,' frequently
receiving a lower wage.2 According to the conventional approach, wage
profiles are computed using the wage for whatever job the individual
currently holds. These wages are then related statistically to tenure on
that job and to overall experience. As a result, the conventional approach
mixes together wage data for continued work while not retired with data
for work while partially retired, using weights that are determined by
the frequency with which these simultaneously avai1.-'i a1tern;t.ives are
chosen.While theconventional approach mayhe adequatefor rlescrihinr4
thewage path currently traveled by older workers, it is not adequate
for describing the opportunity set they face.
In section I of the paper, separate wageprofiles are estimated
forolder workers who are not retired and for thosewho arepartially
retired.Tests areperformed to determine whethertheseequations are2
significantly different from one another. These tests indicate that
there are significant differences n intercept and slope, and there-
fore thatit is improper to use a single profile calculated from
pooled wage data as in the conventional approach. Section II dis-
cusses the implications of these findings for the wage offers facing
older workers -contrastingpredictions based on the conventionally
calculated wage-tenure profile with those from an opportunity set
consisting of two separate, sirnultaneouly available wage profiles.
It is shown that in some circumstances the conventional approach
provides wage predictions that are quite misleading. Section TIT of
the paper demonstrates that the wage—experience profile, as computed
in the conventional approach from pooled date for the partially and
non-retired, exagerates substantially the downturn in the wage offer
for continued work in the job held while not retired. T major reason is
that the probability of partial retirement is much higher for those
with the highest levels of experience. Therefore, the weight given to
the low wage rates of individuals who are partially retired rises with
experience. In that section, selectivity bias inthe experienceprofile
is also discussed. Findings are summarized in the final section and
conclusions are presented.
I. Wage Equation Estimates
The wage equations we estimate are all of theform:
(1)2nW=a+bTen+cTen2+dExp + eExp2 + fx4-c3
whereW =Thehourly wage rate (deflated bo 1967 dollars by anindexof
usualhourlyearnings)
Ton=Yenr; (iitenure
Exp=Yearsof experience (age—yearsof educ. —6)
XA set of control variables
=Arandom error term
The equations are estimated using data from the 1969, 1971, 1973 and
1975 waves of the Retirement History Survey. Only white males who
are not self employed and for whom required data were available in at
least one survey year are included in the sample.4 Individuals in the
samplewere 58 to63 years old in the initial survey year.
Forany individual, only thelast wage observed while working
foraparticularemployer is included. Thus if an individual reported
in an early year of the survey that he was not retired and working full
time, and in a later year that he retired partially on another job, two
observations are included. But if he reported that he worked for the
same employer for all four years, only one (the last) wage rate observation
is included.5
There is some loss in efficiency from using only one wage observation
for each job. In view of the large sample size avialable to us, this loss
should not be too great. Moreover, the correlation htween year to year
wage observations within the same job is high. For those who are not
retired and are working for the same employer, the correlation is .69.
It is .56 for those who are partially retired in more than one year and
are working for the same employer.6 In addition, the longitudinal
feature of the data is not required to isolate vintage effects, which we4
do estimate and are discussed below. Accordingly, given the costs of
adjusting for serial correlation the face of a truncated sample with
a larger number of observations, and the limited benefits to be ex-
pected from such an adjustment over the procedure we do follow, we
chose the alternative procedure of using only the last observation
from each job. Note also that although it would he easier to implement
than the procedure we follow, pooling all, possible wage observations
while ignoring serial correlation would he an inappropriate procedure.
Our major interest is in testing for differences in parameter estimates
among wage equations estimated for those falling in alternative re-
tirement categories. The biases in estimated standard errors created
by serial correlation would seriously undermine the validity of such
tests; while the problems created by the procedure we follow are not
nearly so severe.
The independent variables included in the vector X in equation
1, a number of which correspond to those used by Gordon arid Blinder
(1980) ,areas follows:
(1) A set of four duimny variables defined for broad occupational
categories.
(2) A dummy variable indicating coverage by a private pension
plan on the current job.
(3) A dummy variable indicating coverage by a public pension plan
on the current job.
(4) A variable equal to 10 minus years to mandatory retirement
age, or equal to zero if there is no mandatory retirement.
(5) Adummyvariable indicating a short term health problem.5
(6)A dummyvariableindicating a 1 onq term hr'a.l Hi prob) om.
(7)A dummy variable indicaIing that a health pioblem ended the
last job.
(8)A dummy variable equaling 1 ifthe father grew up outside
ofa farm.
(9) Years of formal schooling.
(10)P. variable equaling 0 if education is <8,otherwise equal to
ed-8.
(11) A variable equaling 0 if education is <12,otherwise equal to
ed—12.
(12) A dummy variable equaling 1 if ed >12.
(13)A dummy variable equaling 1 if ed >16.
Table 1 reports the coefficient estimates for the torture and
experience variables, and some relevant statistics pertaining to the
regressions for those in the main job and not retired at all, for those
who have partially retired, and for both groups pooled.7 Coefficients
of other standardizing variables are reported in the appendix. Using
standard F tests, we find that the tenure variables are. jointly signi-
ficant at the 1% level in all three wage equations.8 The same is true
for the experience variables. The signs of the experience variables
differ between the equation for the not retired and for the partially
retired, but it will be seen below that this change insigndoes not
mean that wages are positively related to experience in one case, but
negatively related in the other. At high levels of experience, all
three profiles appear to decline as experience increases, but the rates




(1) (2) Pooled Results
Not Partially (Conventionally
Retired Retired Estimated Profile)
Coef. of .096 -.257 .125
Exp. (2.40) (—1.77) (3.37)
Coef.of —.00112 .00217 .00l58
Exp.2 (—2.57) (1.46) (—3.99)
Coef.of .0068 .0144 .0101
Ten. (3.59) (2.19) (5.31)
Coef. of —.000027 -.000124 —.00008
Ten.2 (—.66) (—.80) (1.94)
R2 .300 .242 .327
Stand. Error .4398 .6516 .4825
No. of Obs. 3955 696 4651
Expon. of
$2.93 $1.82 $2.73
Exp. 46.2 49.2 46.6
(SDExp.) (3.81) (4.00) (3.98)
Ten 18.5 10.3 17.3
(SD Ten.) (13.8) (12.7) (14.0)
t-statistics are in parenthesesdiffer in an important way.9
Turn now to the question of entral concern to thispaper. Are the
separate wage equations based on data for those who are not retired and
for those who are partially retired significantly differentfrom one
another? The first step in answering this question is to testwhether
the two equations have significantly different interceptterms, con-
straining the equations to have equal slope coefficients. This test is
performed by adding a dummy variable for partial retirement to the
pooled equation. This dummy is found to he highly significant,indicating
a substantial difference in the intercept terms for the two equations.l0
The second step tests whether the experience and tenure variables
can be constrained to have the same values for the not retired and for
the partially retired.11 This test involves adding fouradditional
variables to the pooled equation: the four tenure and experience vari-
ables multiplied by a dummy variable indicating partial retirement.
These four variables as a group are found to be significantly different
from zero, indicating that a simple intercept dummy is not sufficient to




The tenure profiles implied by the coefficients in the threewage
equations in Table 1 are pictured in Figure 1. ?lso pictured in the
bottomof that figure is a curve plotting the ratio of the number partially
retired to the total of those not retired andpartiallyretired -the




























































































































seen from that figure that the probability of partial retirement peaks
at very low tenure. This ref1ect the behavior of those who partially
retire outside the job they held while not retired. The probability
of partial retirement is relatively constant at higher levels of tenure,
reflecting the behavior of those who phase into partial retirement in
the same job they held while not retired. This probability does, how-
ever, rise again at very high levels of tenure (not pictured i.n the
figure) ,levelsat which there are very few observations.
What are the differences in predicted wages between the wage profile
computed following the conventional approach and the wage profiles which
recognize the existence of simultaneous offers for work while not
retired and work while partially retired? Table 2 presents information
useful for answering this question, while in Figure 1 we illustrate points
pertaining to the information in Table 2. Considera worker with

















average characteristics for the sample as a whole, whichare very close
inVa] 110 to average charactcristi s forthenotreti red.I U lie keeps
workinga notretired,according to the conventional (pooled)wage
equationhis earnings,corresponding to point A inFigure 1(at around
18years of job tenure) ,wouldbe equal to $2.78.In contrast to the
conventionalapproach, the differences in wage paid to nonretirees and to
partial retirees may be recognized. The respective predicted wage for an
individual with average characteristics for the not retired, who is in
fact not retired, is $2.94, and corresponds t.o point A' in Figure
PointA" represents the predicted wage of au incHi1u:i1wi Hi rnic rage
characteristics of the not_retired,who is infact purtial1v retired.
This predicted wage, equal to $2.41, lies above the wage tenure profile
forthe partially retired, which is drawn holding variables measuring
health, education, father's status and experience at values appropriate
forthe partiallyretired group.14 The predicted wages associated with
notretired and partially retired individuals with similar characteristics
(points A' and A") differ from the predictions from the pooled wage
equation (point A) by 5.8% and -13.3% respectively. The single wage
prediction obtained from the conventional approach for a job which is
newly secured (i.e. with 0 tenure) is $2.38 for our typical individual.
(corresponding to point B). When work while not retired and work while
partially retired are distinguished, the wage offers at zero tenure,
corresponding to points B' and B" in Figure 1, are $2.62 and $1.94 re-
spectively. These differ from the conventional estimates by 10.1% for
15
work while not retired, and -18.5% for work while partially retired.
Thus the conventional approach may underpredict the wage for those who
are not retired and overpredict the wage for those who are partially11
retirehy i zeahie amoimbs.
Moreover, the conventional approach is simply not appropriate for
analyzing variation in the relative wages offered for work when partially
retired and not retired —variationthat depends on the institutional
constraints facing the older individual. More specifically, our esti-
mates suggest that there are three factors affecting the relativewage
offers between work when not retired and work when partially retired:
a) A lower wage is paid to those who are partially retired than to those
not retired, even if they partially retire on their main job and hence
do not lose their accumulated tenure; b) those who face a lower limit
constraint on hours of work on the main job must forego accumulated
tenure to partially retire, reducing the wage commensurately; c) when one
changes jobs, either because partial retirement is not available on the
mainjob or hccaise age of mandalory retirement ha; been reached, the
new job may differfromthe old one in characteri 5t1C5 that bear a relati en
tothe wage offer—e.g.,pension coverage, years to mandatory retirement
andoccupation.'6 The conventionalapproach picks up the combined effects
of these three factors without distinguishing among them For example,
continuingwith thedata in Table 2, if an individual can partially retire
in the main job, the dominant set of offers -thatis the best single
offers —are$2.94 for work when not retired and $2.41 For work when
partially retired, a 22% difference in the wage for work when not retired
and when partially retired. If the individual must change jobs in order
to partially retire, the dominant offers are $2.94 and $1.94, a 52% dif-
ference in the wage. Here, to partially retire the individual must leave
the main job.17 Clearly, the difference in wage offers for work when
partially retired and when not retired varies siibntantiai 1 y dependingon12
the institutional constraints facing the worker. Yet the conventional
approach cannot be used to descrile the effects on the wage offer set of
these different constraints.
The best available structural analysis of retirement behavior, that
of Gordon and Blinder (1980) ,relieson the conventional approach to
analyzing the wage equation. Their analysis ignores the role of the wage
differential between work when not retired and when partially retired,
assuming instead that all workers face, at a moment in time, a single
dominant wage offer. In particular, they assume that all workers are
free, in the absence of mandatory retirement, to phase into retirement by
reducing hours on the main job from full-time work to zero. The con-
sequences of this assumption for parameter estimates in structural retire-
ment models are discussed in a companion piece (Gustman and Steinmeier,
forthcoming). Consequences of adopting an alternative assumption, that
all workers must work full time or not at all on all -jobs, is also
discussed in that paper.'8
III. Wa9-Experience PrOfiles
Figure 2 pictures the three wage—experience profiles derived from
the equations in Table 1. Also pictured in that diagram is a curve
indicating the probability that a wage observation will he for a person
who is partially retired, as a function of labor market experience.
Given the continuous positive relation between that probability and
experience, the fact that the average wage is substantiallylower for
those who are partially retired, and the influence of the "significantly"
more negative slope of wage equation for the partially retired,the





























































































































































































distinguish between those who are and arc not partially retired, will
exhibit a slope that over—states the decline in the wage paid for
continuedfulltime work in the main job with increasing experience.
For the 'pooled" sample,the mean experience is 46.6 years. Plus or
minus two standard deviations (of four years) itranges from 38.6 to
54.6 years. According to the pooled results, from 39 to 55 years of
experience the wage declines from $3.02 to $2.08, or 31% over the 16
year period.'9 The wage rate decline over the same period for those
who nre notroti.rerI(from $2.95 to$2.58)i about.
Thoseresults suggest that the measured dcc i no of the 'ago for
older workers with increasing experience implied by a conventional estimate
of the wage equation may overstate the decline with increasing experience
inthe wage offer for work while not retired by as much as 60 percent.
This finding should be of considerable interest to those studying the productivity
wage profile relation, depreciation of human capital contracts and related topics.
To the standard analysis of wage profiles, the 'cJectiv.ity bias
one worries about results from the fact that there are no wage observa-
tions for those who are fully retired. If, however, the analysis
distinguishes between partial retirement and nonretirement, then current
wage observations for the not retired equation are not available either
for those who are currently retired or for those who are partially
retired. The analogous situation holds for observations of wages when
partially retired.
The experience profile examined above has not been corrected for
the effect of selectivity bias. A full correction required the estima-
tion of a complete structural model, explaining the probabilities of15
nonretirement, partial retirement, and ful.l retirement. Such a model should
dealexplicitly with the role of fower limit constraints on hours of work
affecting those in a majority of main jobs. Tn an earlier study using
thesesame data grouped into categories, we took a less complete approach
to test for selectivity bias. Using retirement equations with outcome cate-
gori that clinti eguishedbetween those who were nnretired annthose}ir
wereparti allyretired, we found that correction factors analogous to
theMill's ratio weresignificant, but didnot have a sizable influence
either in wage equations for work on the main job or for work while
partially retired. Carliner (1982) ,usingthe Parses data for older
workers and distinguishing only between those who were not retired and
those who were, came to a similar conclusion.2'
Construction of a more complete structural model for purposes of
refining the estimates of selectivity biasis a task thatwould take
us beyond the scope of this paper. However, we can use the longitudinal
nature of the wage data to examine one aspect of the selectivity problem,
whether those individuals with wage observations in various categories
in later years of the survey had wage residuals while not retired in
earlier survey years that were higher or lower than average.22
Table 3 reports on residuals from the wage equations Forthosewho
arenot retired and for those who are either partially or not retired
(thepooled wage equation) .Since,given their standard deciat: ions
theresiduals are not significantly differentfrom zero, the discussion
thatfollows is mainly speculative.
Consider the wage equation for the not retired group. Pt a rela-
tively low level of experience, say below 37 years, the sample is probably*
16
Table 3
Average Wage Residuals Two Years Earlier
by Level of Experience*











































































youngenoughthatalmost everyone is st.i 1 1 workingliii 1.t imc',and
selectionis not yet a problem. Now look at the group with 38 to 39
years of experience. According to the table, two years earlier this
group had average wages that were 1.5% greater than would be have been
predicted from the wage equation. Evidence cited earlier (see page 3)
suggests that perhaps two-thirds of this residual persists from one
observation to the next, so that the group still has wages that are
1.0% greater than the average for everyone, including the individuals
who have partially or completely retired in the meantima. In other
words, the experience curve drawn in Figure 2 would he about one percent
lower at 38-39 years of experience if the wage equation included observations for
everyone, including those for whom wages were not available.
For the next group, with 40 to 41 years of experience, we see
that they had a residual two years earlier that was 1.3% relative to
the group that was included in the regression then. We have already
seen, though, that the group two years earlier, with 38 to 39 years
of experience, had wages that were on the average 1.0% higher than
we would have expected to find had the regression included wage for
partially and completely retired individuals. So, for the group with
40 to 41 years of experience, the wage two years previously was about
2.3% (1.0% +1.3%)above what might have been found had the regression
considered wages for the partially and completely retired. Again, if
two-thirds of the residual persists over time, we would expect that
not retired irivididuals with 40-41 years of experience would have wages
that wore about 1.5% above what would be found had the sample also
included partially and completely retired individuals. This implies18
that the true experience curve for all individuals probably lies about
1.5% below the curve calculated from a regression based solely on
individuals who are not retired.
These calculations were continued for greater levels of experience,
and also for the pooled wage equation, with the results being found in
the "cumulative effect" columns of Table 3. These results indicate
that the curves, corrected for selection problems, would probably lie
below the estimated curves for low levels of experience and would rise
above the estimated curves forhigh levels of experience.rn other
words, the curves, corrected for selectivity problems, would probably
be flatter that the estimated curves, and the correction would be
slightly greater for the pooled wage equation than for the equation
including only the not retired.23
V. Conclusions
Older workers are likely to face at least two wage offers which
they View as competing, pay for work while not retired and pay for work
while partially retired. The conventional approach to the analysis
of wage profiles pools all wage observations without distinguishing
those who are partially retired from those who are not retired. Wage
profiles based on the conventional approach are constructed as if
there were a single wage offer for those with given experience and
tenure, whatever their retirement status.
Based on our empirical analysis, we reach the following conclusions.
First, the wages for work while not retired and for work while partially
retired are significantly different from one another. Second, the wageI 9
offersfacing older workers may vary considerably with the institu-
tional limitations they face -i..,betweenthose who do and do not
face lower limit constraints requiring full-time work or none at all
on their main job.
Third, selectivity bias aside, failing to distinguish between wages
paid to those who are partially retired and those who are not retired
causes the decline in wages with experience to be greatly exaggerated.
At highest levels of experience, the relative number of wage observa-
tions for those who are partially retired and receiving a low wage is
greatest. The resulting bias is so large that the slope in wage
experience profiles as conventionally estimated may overstate the
decline with experience in wage offers for work while not retired by
as much as 60 per cent. In addition, there is some suggestion that
wage profiles which do not correct for selectivity bias may overstate
the degree of decline in the wage with experience, with the correction
for the pooled wage equation being slightly greater than the correction
for the wage equation for the riot retired. Since selectivity bias has
relatively similar effects on the wage profile as conventionally
estimated and on the wage profile for those who are not retired, a
conventionally estimated wage profile, evencorrected for selectivity
bias, may overstate the decline in the slope of the wage-experience
profile.20
11'pcndix —CoefficientEstimates for Control
Variables Standardized for in Computing Table 1*
(3)
(1) (2) Pooled Results
Not Partially (Conventionally
















Mandatory Re- .003 .023 .006
tirement Horizon (1.30) (1.71) (2.49)
Short Term —.042 -.167 -.075
Health Problem (—1.01) (-1.28) (—1.84)
Long Term .084 -1.04 -1.06
Health Problem (—4.51) (—1.81) (5.77)
Health Problem -.060 -.157 -.100








Years of Ed. >8
(2.05) (.35) (2.66)
—.006 -.038 -.0035










'In this study, an individual is classifiedas partial].y retired
if he says that he is.(For a comparison with other definitions of
partial retirement based on declines in wages or hours of work, see
Gustman and Steinmeier, 1981.)
2Notice that we refer in thispaper only to the wage, not to
compensation. Returns to work, especially for older workers, are in-
fluenced importantly by provisions of both private retirement programs
and by Social Security. They may also be influenced by compensating
differentials for difficulty of work. For a reaevant analysis of pensions,
see Lazear (1982). On Social Security see Blinder, Gordon and Wise
(1980 and 198Z and Burkhauser and Turner (1982).Quinn(1977) analyzes
nonpecuniary aspects of jobs.
3mis form of thewage equation, with the wage measured in logs
and quadratic effects of tenure and experience, has been adopted here
to conform with wage equations estimated in the related literature.
4A11wages are deflated to 1967 using the index of hourly earnings
from the Economic Report of the President, 1981, Table B-36. Wage
observations which implied an hourly wage above $100 or below 25 per
hour were eliminated from the sample. Most of the latter observations
appear to be the result of an inconsistent response to a question that
asked the individual to report wage per unit of time, and then asked
that, except in the case of an hourly wage, cents be rounded to the
nearest dollar. It appears that in some cases the hourly wage was also
rounded. Accordingly, a response such as 2, meaning $2 per hour,may22
havebeen coded as 2 cents per hour.
5Since only the last wage observed for each employer is included,
truncation of the survey in 1975 and inclusion of all wage observations
for that year mean that the probability of a wage observation being
included in the regression is not strictly reflective of its probability
in the population. In addition, the inclusion of the last wage received
from an employer means that for some individuals who retire partially
on a job previously held while not retired, the wage paid while not
retired at all is undersampled. A comparison of the probabilities of
partial retirement computed directly from the survey with the prob-
abilities of observing a wage for an individual in the sample who is
partially retired suggests that our procedure slighlly understates
the probability of partial retirement, with the degree of understatement
being greater at highest rather than lowest levels of experience.
Analogously, there is relative over—sampling of the wage observations
for those who are not retired and who experience frequent job turnover.
Fewer than 10% of those observed as not retired have more than one
employer during the period of the survey. As a result of the lower
weight given to the partially retired, especially at higher levels of
experience, the wage—experience profile computed from pooled observa-
tions using only a single observation for each job understates, but not
to a significant degree, the decline in the wage profile that would
be calculated from a pooled cross-section profile which included all
wage observations.
6The correlation between wage residuals in main and partial retire-
inent jobs is .31.23
this study, the main job is defined as any job held full—time
by an individual who reports he is not retired. In our earlier study
(Gustman and Steinmejer, 1981) ,wedefined main job as the job held
full-time at age 55. Of those who are partially retired and for whom
appropriate data are available, 53% have partiall.y retired on jobs they
held previously while not retired. However, only 32% of these partially
retired individuals are in jobs they previously held at age 55.
Observations for individuals who are partially retired in jobs
where they are self employed were eliminated from the sample, even if
the "main job" held by the individual did riot involve self employment.
On the one hand, this procedure avoids inflating the opportunity wage
while partially retired by the returns to own capital. On the other
hand, it disregards some obviously superior opportunities while
partially retired available to some workers not self employed on their
main job, causing the return to partial retirement to he understated.
8When added to thewage equation for those who ar not retired,
ali.rinar term rc'flecting year of birth has a coefficientequal. to .01,
indicatingthat real wages are higher by about 1%foreachyear earlier
theindividual isborn. This variable reflects the combined effects of
vintageand year of observation. There is only slight effect on the
coefficients of theexperienceand tenure variahie; from includinga
measure related to year of birth.
91f thepartiallyretired group is dividedaccordinq to whether
or not the individuals had previously considered themselves to be not
retired at all in their current jobs, significant differences re found
betweenthe two groups. However, for a considerable number ofpartially24
retired individuals, it is impossible to ascertain whether or not they
had previously considered themselves not retired in the job. In order
to avoid dropping these observations, we do not distinguish between
various groups of partially retired individuals and instead concentrate
on the differences between partially retired individuals and individuals
who are not retired at all.
10 .. Theestimated coefficient of the dummy variable is -0.19, with
a t-statistic of 8.14. This coefficient does not, however, represent
the full effect of partial retirement on the wage. Ps we discuss in
section II below, the actual wage difference between those not retired
and those partially retired will be larger than this coefficient,
reflecting the effects of differences in the characteristics of jobs
held by those in each retirement category. These job related charac-
teristics, reflecting pension coverage, mandatory retirement provisions
and occupations, bear a systematic relation to the wage.
- • .I_t. L.-.... .,.11— 4.1.--..1-1-L.-. 1.4-. .-- Oiie nu. gilLinLLromie au'jver L A u. a.Oi —
veritionalwage equation of a variable measuring hours of work, a
variable which is likely to be correlated with an indicator of whether
the individual is partially or not retired, might help to avoid some of the
bias in the conventional approach. However, Zabalza, Pissarides and
Barton (1980, p. 258) report that such a variable was not significant
in wage equations which they fit in a sample of workers in the U.K.
Clark, Johnson and Sumner (1981) also reported mixed results on the
use of an hours variable. Questions as to whether a different specif-
ication from the ones employed in these studies, or whether other
dimensions of partial retirement, such as lowered difficulty of work25
or limLtecl responsibility, could explain t.henegative impact c)f partial
retirement on the wage remain the ubject forfuture investigation.
UTheoretical considerationsin addition to those related to the
effects of minimum hours constraints on thechoices facing older workers
fail to prescribe identical coefficientson the independent variables
in the two wage equations. Indeed, while inpractice full—time work
has been the more remunerative, theory doesnot determine whether the
hourly wage for part—time work or for full-time work shouldhe highest.
There are a number of forces on both thesupply and demand sides of the
market which are working in opposite directions.On the supply side,
the existence of fixed costs of working leadsone to expect a higher
supply price (higher reservation wage) for jobs thatoffer the opportunity
to work only a limited number of hours. Incontrast on the supply side,
some people, especially those who arecompeting with older workers for
part-time jobs, have a discontinuous marginal cost oftime. Most
importantly, time available after school or during thesummer has a
low opportunity cost for youth, while forsome parents with schoOl age
children, still primarily women, time during school hoursmay have a
relatively low opportunity cost. On the demand side, fixedhiring,
bookkeeping and start up costs of working to the firm would leadone to
expect a lower wage offer for part—time than for full-time work.On the
other hand, firms facing demand patterns whichare characterized by
clear peaks and valleys (e.g., restaurants and retailestablishments)
will find that the hourly productivity of part-timeworkers, whose
employment can be targeted on peak demand, is relativelyhigh.26
'2The F statistic for the significance of these four variables as
a group is 16.31 with (4, 4525) degrees of freedom. The critical
value for a 1% significance test is 3.32
13By 'average characteristics of the not retired" we mean that
the individual has the average values for the not retired in the health,
education, whether the father worked on a farm arid experience variables.
'4Noadjustmentis made for occupation, pension coverage or mandatory
retirement variables. These are job related differences which would
differ between those who are partially retired and those who are not, even if
the jobs were held by the same individual. It will be seen below that
the difference in wages between the not retired and the partially retired
varies considerably with the level of experience. The difference in
the average experience between the not retired and partially retired
groups is only three years. But this higher level of experience for
the partially retired group is associated with a reduction in the log
wage of .15, representing 80% of the distance between P." and the wage
profile for the partially retired.
caveat should be noted. The predicted wage for employment while
not retired but working on a new job is influenced by the wages of those
who are not retired and have low levels of job tenure.P. significant
proportion of those with low levels of tenure are employed in jobs that
are characterized by high turnover. They have skills that are more
likely to be industry or occupation specific rather than firm specific -
e.g.,construction workers. Considerations such as these, and dif-
ferences in remaining work life between prime age and older workers,27
createdoubts that tenure will play similar roles in wage equations for
older and for prime age workers. Thus the wages received by those with
low job tenure may not provide a good basis for predicting the oppor-
tunity wage for a newly separated older worker. This brings up the
issue of availability of jobs, at alternative wages, to older workers,
the determinants of search time until receiving a job offer, and
relatedquestions which have yet to be answered for older workers who
are job losers hut do not wish to retire.
'6Gordon and linder (1980,p. 290) discuss the desirability of
older workers changing jobs. One reason they give for a job change,
whichisnotconsistent with the specification of theirmodel,is to
reduce hours of work. In evaluating the desirability of such a change,
they note that the wage offer would be reduced on the new job both
as a result of changes in job characteristics (e.g. change in pension
coverage) and because of a loss in job tenure. Given the size of the
loss, they state that on balance, the typical wage loss from a job
transition late in life appears to be quite severe. They find it doubt-
ful, therefore, that many older workers will want to make such trans-
itions voluntary.
17 implication of work by Borjas (1981) and by Carliner (1981)
is that the wage offer is lowered even further if the job held does
not correspond to longest job. When a dummyvariableindicating whether
ornotcurrent occupation corresponds to longest occupation is entered
in our wage equations, it has negative and significant coefficients
(with t-statistics of over 5) in the wage equations for those who are28
not retired arid in the pooled result, indicatii-iq a decline in the log
wage of about .09 if the individual is employed in an occupation other
thanhis longest. The coefficient is —.02 in theequation for the
partiallyretired, with a t—statistic of 0.33. When thisvariableis
entered in the three equations in Table 1, the tenure coefficients all
decline, while the tenure squared coefficients all increase. The fact
that occupation change from longest job is of such importance increases
the potential effect of a lower limit constraint on hours of work on
the wage offers facing a given worker. To understand more fully the
effect of job change on wages, the relation for older workers of wage
offers to reason for job change would have to he analyzed.
'8For such a model, see for example, Burbidge and Robb (1980).
'9Thewage decline with experience indicated by thepooled results
would he even steeper ifas in many studies of earnings profiles, we
did not standardize for occupation. Instead, we follow the Gordon
and Blinder specification, which does standardize. is is well known,
earnings profiles covering the full life cycle do not standardize for
occupation when attempting to isolate the returns to education because
some of these returns are realized through choice of occupation. The
goal of wage equations used in retirement studies is to obtain the best
prediction of wage offers, predictions that are enhanced by inclusion
of the occupational variable.
201t can be seen in Figure 2 that at lower levels of experience
the predicted wage based on the pooled wage equation slightly exceeds
the wage predicted from observations for those who are not retired. In29
this range there are relatively few observations. The wage—experience
profiles at these extremes are influenced by the curvature of the log
wage profiles, which is constrained to be parabolic.
21Gordon and Blinder (1980) tested for selectivity bias in the
context of their model of retirement behavior. They found that compared
to coefficients in a linear approximation of the market wage equation
which is not corrected for selectivity bias, for some variables the
correction for selectivity bias turn out to he sizeable. Their tests
and correction make use of a maximum likelihood procedure which estimates
jointly the retirement and wage equations. Accordingly, their correction
is conditional on the specification of their entire model. We have
argued elsewhere (Guotman and Steinxrteier, forthcoming) that this specif-
ication is incorrect because it does not allow for the fact that. most
people are not free to reduce hours of work below full—time on their
main job.
222\riother type of selectivity bias would result if those who kept
working in later years experienced less deterioration in their wages
than those who left the sample would have experienced. We do not examine
this type of selectivity bias.
23The correction would at first appear to be particularly great for
the pooled equation at 54 to 55 years of experience. However, the high
negative residual of —.094 represents only 95 observations. Were an
adjustment for selectivity bias done, this observation is expected to
exert an influence on the curvature of the wage equation that reflected
its sample size, which is small compared with the sample sizes for the
other levels of experience.30
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